On the security of permissioned blockchain solutions for IoT applications by Brotsis, Sotirios et al.
On the Security of Permissioned Blockchain
Solutions for IoT Applications
Sotirios Brotsis∗, Nicholas Kolokotronis∗, Konstantinos Limniotis†, Stavros Shiaeles‡
∗University of Peloponnese, Greece. Email: {brotsis, nkolok}@uop.gr
†Hellenic Data Protection Authority, Greece. Email: klimniotis@dpa.gr
‡University of Portsmouth, UK. Email: stavros.shiaeles@port.ac.uk
Abstract—The blockchain has found numerous applications in
many areas with the expectation to significantly enhance their
security. The Internet of things (IoT) constitutes a prominent
application domain of blockchain, with a number of architectures
having been proposed for improving not only security but also
properties like transparency and auditability. However, many
blockchain solutions suffer from inherent constraints associated
with the consensus protocol used. These constraints are mostly
inherited by the permissionless setting, e.g. computational power
in proof-of-work, and become serious obstacles in a resource-
constrained IoT environment. Moreover, consensus protocols with
low throughput or high latency are not suitable for IoT networks
where massive volumes of data are generated. Thus, in this paper
we focus on permissioned blockchain platforms and investigate
the consensus protocols used, aiming at evaluating their per-
formance and fault tolerance as the main selection criteria for
(in principle highly insecure) IoT ecosystem. The results of the
paper provide new insights on the essential differences of various
consensus protocols and their capacity to meet IoT needs.
Index Terms—Permissioned blockchains, consensus protocols,
cyber-security, fault tolerance, Internet of things.
I. INTRODUCTION
The blockchain is an innovative technology that has proved
to bring considerable advantages in many areas by inherently
providing security, interoperability and sustainability; it can be
used as an independent root-of-trust in an distributed (possibly
adversarial) setting to allow a set of entities mutually trust
each other. For this reason, the blockchain is considered as
a decentralized technology for the sharing of information and
performing transactions in a secure manner. In contrast to per-
missionless blockchains, in which any node can participate in
the network (Ethereum, Bitcoin, etc.), the permissioned
blockchains are characterized by the fact that the participating
nodes who regulate and amend the state of the ledger can be
identified and can be held accountable for their actions. The
key idea behind this concept is to address the privacy needs
and other requirements of distributed applications, as well as
to provide convenient access control mechanisms with some
means of identification.
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The current state-of-the-art in permissioned blockchains is
rather to adopt the design decisions made in permissionless
architectures [1]. Unfortunately, in most cases this approach
leads to sub-optimal performance since a well-defined protocol
under the rules of a public ledger, often with financial orien-
tation, might not be well addressing the challenges of private
networks and IoT environments. The transactions’ fees, the
(high) processing time and (low) networks’ throughput should
not be inherited by the consensus protocols of permissioned
blockchains. Apart from the above constraints, the IoT devices
should not be part of the consensus process themselves, due to
the fact that several consensus protocols demand considerable
computational resources that smart devices do not possess.
These issues have been identified in numerous permissioned
blockchains [1], where the design decisions inherited by the
permissionless settings pose great threats to the security, per-
formance, and eventually the blockchain solution’s suitability
in demanding IoT applications.
Apart from several attacks in blockchains and distributed
ledgers, like double-spending and selfish mining, permissioned
blockchains often rely on low-level trust models for validation
that are originating from the consensus protocol and are hard to
be adapted to the operation of smart contracts [2]. In addition,
nodes involved in the consensus protocol might stop working,
start behaving in a malicious manner, or acting selfishly against
common goals and thus undermine the security of the protocol.
Therefore, the consensus nodes should execute a fault-tolerant
protocol to safeguard the integrity of the transactions as well
as the total order in which they are included in the blockchain
in order to deliver a continuous service.
Motivated by the above concerns, and the need for enforcing
accountability in many applications, this paper focuses on per-
missioned blockchains and analyses the properties of a large
number of state-of-the-art consensus protocols. Accountability
is achieved either directly by immediately proving that a node
behaved in a dishonest way, or indirectly by inferring possible
malicious behavior using side information at some later stage;
trust management schemes can be used to expose long-term
malicious trends that are difficult to distinguish at any given
time if considered independently. Our work complements the
reports by Cachin [3], Xiao [4], Zheng [5], Wu [6], Salimitari
[7], Lao [8], and Ferdous [9], by considerably extending the
number of blockchain platforms and consensus protocols that
are studied, by providing quantitative information about their
and the Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the 
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performance (i.e. throughput and latency) instead of qualitative
information that is given in all works (thus, allowing to easily
consider issues related to scalability), and by evaluating their
suitability for IoT applications also taking into account their
resilience to adversarial faults. The comparative evaluation of
the various consensus protocols suggests that only few of them
meet IoT needs, in addition to achieving high security.
The paper is next organized as follows. Section II introduces
the basics about consensus protocols’ security against faults.
In Section III and IV we give a detailed analysis of the most
prominent crash fault tolerant and Byzantine fault tolerant con-
sensus protocols for permissioned blockchain platforms. The
comparative evaluation of the various protocols is provided in
Section IV-M, whereas Section VI concludes the paper and
discusses future research steps.
II. FAULT TOLERANCE PROPERTIES
Distributed systems are often disciplined by a set of clients
and services, where each service utilizes one or more servers
to extract information or execute operations that are requested
from the clients. Using a central server is the easiest way
to fulfill the necessary needs and the implementation of a
service, but it posses a major concern about the security of
an IoT network, due to the fact that it becomes a single point
of failure (SPoF). Thus, to avoid centralized faults, multiple
servers should be deployed to implement a Fault Tolerant
service with state machine replication (SMR) [10].
The pioneering work of Lamport [11], who introduced the
Byzantine Agreement, triggered the research of developing
algorithms in order to exploit and construct resilient distributed
systems. Nonetheless, several blockchain systems deviate from
the classical SMR in crucial ways. Many distributed applica-
tions run simultaneously and can be deployed at any time, even
if the embedded application code is un-trusted or occasionally
malicious. The key idea to provide security in blockchains is
to reach agreement on a single request from a client, which is
the core functionality of a consensus protocol. In the context
of blockchains, a consensus protocol or as it is commonly
known as an “atomic broadcast”, provides a total order of the
disseminated messages and propagates them to the network
peers.
A. Crash fault tolerance
An atomic broadcast certifies that all the legitimate nodes
output or deliver the identical array of messages by means of
the deliver event. Accurately, considering a set of n nodes in
the network, it certifies that the properties validity, integrity
and total order are fulfilled [12].
The way to achieve consensus (i.e. to realize atomic broad-
cast) in distributed systems that are vulnerable to t < n/2
node crashes is to adopt consensus protocols known as the
viewstamped replication (VSR) [13] and Paxos [14] family
of protocols. To provide security, this family is characterized
by the same rules. In each round a leader is elected or voted to
create a new block and if the ongoing leader crashes or even
if the nodes in the network suspect that the leader has crashed,
the leader is reinstated by proceeding to the next round. This
family of protocols is known today as crash fault tolerant
(CFT) consensus protocols and it guaranties that a set of failing
nodes t < n/2 does not impact the system.
B. Byzantine fault tolerance
Consensus protocols with the purpose of tolerating byzan-
tine nodes, which are subverted by a malicious actor and
avert the common goal of reaching agreement, have recently
emerged. In the Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus
protocols family, the most common protocol is the practical
Byzantine fault tolerant (PBFT) [15], which can be displayed
as a blossom of the VSR/Paxos [13], [14]. In a network
comprised of a set of n nodes, the PBFT consensus protocol
[15] can tolerate f < n/3 subverted nodes using a progression
of rounds with a unique leader within each round. Under the
assumption that the BFT protocols seem to be more secure
than CFT, vast research work has focused on the improvement
of the PBFT with BFT-SMaRt [16] to be considered one of
the most advanced and scalable BFT consensus protocols.
III. CRASH FAULT TOLERANT CONSENSUS
Fault-Tolerant algorithms have acquired momentous obser-
vation over the years [17]. Some of them provide significant
results of solving consensus, in an optimum way, by identify-
ing bounds on the security beneath different models. In this
section, we survey recent CFT consensus protocols, focusing
on results for permissioned, IoT-based blockchain platforms.
However, these protocols cannot endure malicious activities
but they can only tolerate 50% of the network crashes, making
their adoption for IoT networks not a very appropriate choice.
A. Kafka / Zookeeper: Hyperledger Fabric, Corda
Kafka [18] is a distributed publish-subscribe streaming
platform, embraced by Fabric [2] and experimentally by
Corda [19] as a cluster of ordering/notary service. At high
level, the conceptual configuration of Kafka is identical with
the leader – follower setting. The transactions, which Kafka
calls messages, are replicated from the leader to its followers
and if the leader crashes, then one of the followers takes
command. This action ensures the crash-fault-tolerance of
the network. The administration of Kafka [18], including
the systematization of tasks, the election process, the cluster
association, among others, is organized by Zookeeper [20].
Despite the fact that Kafka is CFT, Zookeeper by drifting
Kafka becomes somehow centralized and thus the protocol
is not advised to be deployed in a large network. In simple
words, the ordering service of Fabric is executed by distinct
organizations and Kafka demands one of them to run the
cluster. This means that all the ordering nodes are attracted
to the same cluster, which is under the jurisdiction of a
single organization. Thus, this concept does not assure much
in terms of decentralization, even though that the protocol
achieves a significant throughput with very low latency [2].
In the case of Corda, the enterprise described a prototype
of a Kafka-based CFT notary service [19]. Unfortunately,
the experimental implementation of Kafka in Corda is not
expected to be deployed soon.
B. Raft: Hyperledger Fabric, Sawtooth, Quorum, Corda
Raft [21] is a CFT consensus protocol, alternative to
Paxos [14], implemented in Hyperledger Fabric [2],
Hyperledger Sawtooth [22], Quorum [23] and Corda
[24]. As a voting system, Raft realizes the leader-follower
model, in which each node is characterized as leader, follower
or candidate. The consensus process is parted into the follow-
ing sub-problems: a) the leader election, with the initiation of
the protocol or in case the ongoing leader crashes; b) the log
replication, in which the leader affirms log entries, replicates
them and compels all the followers to acknowledge them
and c) the safety of the protocol, concerning the regulations
imposed on the leader-election process to ensure this security
property [21]. The time in Raft is separated into terms. The
terms are measured with increasing integers and initiated with
an election. If a candidate wins the election, then it takes the
leader’s place for this term. The leader disseminates systematic
heartbeat messages to its followers and if, for a preordained
time period a candidate obtains no heartbeat messages, then it
is presumed that the leader has crashed, which means that a
new election process has to be initiated.
Although Raft is a fast CFT consensus protocol, it pro-
vides low and medium performance if it is implemented in
Corda [25] and Quorum [26] (respectively). On the other
hand, in the new version of Fabric (Fabric v2.0) [27],
in which Raft is the recommended protocol, it is possible
to achieve twice the transaction throughput of Kafka’s and
thousands of transactions in real world scenarios [28], [27]
which makes Fabric with Raft a very good candidate for
IoT applications.
IV. BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANT CONSENSUS
A primary case of failures that is essential to blockchains, is
the malicious behavior caused by an adversary. The failure of
nodes is stated, not only on unintentional crashes, but also on
contemplated attacks in the system, that attempt to defeat the
security enhancements by causing at least forks in the ledger.
In the context of blockchains, the consensus mechanisms are
required to address malicious, selfish and generally any set of
nodes that attempt to alter the protocol, by ensuring the safety
and the global state coherence. For this reason, an adoption of
a BFT protocol with high performance metrics is more suitable
for an IoT environment.
A. PBFT: Hyperledger Sawtooth
PBFT is the first BFT protocol based on SMR and was
developed by Castro and Liskov [15] in 1999. The protocol
has become a synonym of BFT and has attained immense
concern in distributed consensus. Each participating node
is a validating replica (VR); one of them is named to be
the leader. The leader validating replica (LVR) receives a
transaction request from a client, who demands an execution
of an operation. Then, the LVR validates the transaction and
disseminates this request to the other VRs. In a short period
of time, called “batch-timeout”, or after a plethora of ordered
pending transactions, called “batch-size”, a block is created by
the LVR. Then, the block is disseminated to the other VRs to
reach consensus, initializing at the same time the pre-prepare,
prepare and commit phase of consensus. If 2f +1 VRs come
to an agreement upon a decision, then each VR appends this
block as the next block in its private ledger. Although the
protocol provides the desirable performance of over 78000 tps
as shown in [16], it lacks scalability supporting only few tens
of participants in the network; demanding high communication
complexity due to the high number of messages that have to be
transferred [29], [30]. These reasons suggest that the protocol
should be deployed in a small IoT environment, for example
in a small office/home office (SOHO) environment and not in
a large network where the high number of nodes can act as
bottleneck.
B. IBFT: Quorum, Hyperledger Besu, Autonity
Istanbul Byzantine fault tolerant (IBFT) [31] is a quite
appealing proof-of-authority (PoA) mechanism, which is em-
anated from the PBFT and inherits its security properties from
it, by employing the three-phase consensus. In a similar way
to PBFT, the VRs elect a LVR to create a proposed block
and disseminate it to the network, along with a pre-prepare
message. The VRs, upon accepting this pre-prepare message
and to be certain that they are on the same sequence, they enter
the pre-prepared phase and disseminate a prepare message.
The LVR, in its turn, while gathering a number of 2f + 1
prepare messages from the VRs, enters the prepared phase
and disseminates a commit message. This means that the LVR
accepts the proposed block, while declaring that this block
is going to be inserted to its ledger. Then, the VRs, upon
receiving 2f +1 commit messages, they enter the committed
phase and accept the proposed block. Although, IBFT is
similar to PBFT, the later needs some tweaks to be used in
blockchains. In IBFT, the fact that there is no particular client
to demand results by sending requests, makes all the VRs to be
recognized as such. The performance evaluation of Baliga et.
al., [26] for using IBFT and Raft in the Quorum platform
is not peer-reviewed, but it shows that when private smart
contracts are used, in which it is required further encryption
- decryption functions and further communication overhead
among peers, it can be achieved a throughput of 600 650
tps with a latency of around 4.5sec.
C. BFT-SMaRT: Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, Symbiont
Bessani’s protocol is a java-based library implemented in
various platforms such as Hyperledger Fabric [2], R3
Corda [19] (experimentally) and Symbiont Assembly
[32]. In the absence of malicious VRs, BFT-SMaRT [16]
achieves consensus using the message model of PBFT [15],
but in their presence the protocol forces the network to elect
a new LVR and execute the messaging pattern, which is
described in [16]. The differences between the two BFT pro-
tocols is firstly that BFT-SMaRT has enhanced reliability and
multi-core processing concerning the appraisal of signatures.
BFT-SMaRT realizes a modular consensus protocol, which
is not embodied inside of the SMR while the state transfer
and reconfiguration modules are clearly detached from the
agreement method [16]. The supported reconfiguration makes
the protocol to differ from previous BFT systems, in which the
size of the network could not expand or reduced, and allows
VRs to join or leave the network on-the-fly. In the context
of Fabric, the consensus protocol also implements Wheat
[33], a vote assignment model (as the VRs recognize each
other), to achieve the desirable for IoT networks performance
without imperiling the safety and the stability of the consensus.
Although, the protocol is not in a stable mode if it is imple-
mented in Corda, in Fabric’s and Symbiont’s case the
desirable performance for IoT deployment has been achieved
far more than necessary.
D. RBFT: Ontology, Hyperledger Indy
RBFT which stands for redundant Byzantine fault tolerance
is a consensus algorithm proposed by Aublin et al. [34]
and implemented in Ontology [35] and in Indy [36].
The recent BFT protocols elect in each instance a primary
replica, herein called LVR, which demonstrates how all the
incoming requests will be ordered. RBFT introduces a new
approach, running multiple instances concurrently, in order
to identify and quickly replace malicious LVRs, with the
reduction of throughput’s degradation caused by their presence
as its aftereffect. While multiple instances are executed and
order requests, their performance is strictly monitored and only
the requests that have been ordered by the master instance are
executed. The detection of a malicious master LVR, which
wants to smartly and willingly degrade the performance of the
protocol, results from comparing its performance with all the
other LVRs’ performances. This comparison takes place due
to the fact that in BFT protocols it is hard for VRs to presume
the throughput that a non-malicious LVR would have. In the
case, where a LVR is faster that the master LVR, then a new
LVR is elected in each instance and the master LVR is marked
as malicious. In RBFT [34], when malicious faults occur, the
throughput is degraded only by 3%, while the degradation
of other existing BFT protocols, under the same faults, is at
the best of circumstances equivalent to 78%. This property
makes the protocol a quite appealing mechanism to be used
in IoT environments; if it is combined with a platform with
high performance.
E. VBFT: Ontology
VBFT [37], the core consensus protocol of Ontology,
[35], relies on verifiable random functions (VRF) [38] to
introduce randomness and is combined with proof-of-stake
(PoS) and Byzantine tolerance to provide resistance against
malicious acts. The whole network consists of two different
types: The consensus nodes, where the stake of each partic-
ipant has significant impact; and the consensus candidates,
in which the nodes do not aid the consensus process, but
validate consensus blocks and update their ledger. Due to the
randomness provided by the VRF function, the VBFT protocol
selects different sets of nodes, which are difficult to predict
and each one of them is assigned a different work to perform.
At first, each proposal node creates and proposes a new block.
The proposed blocks are collected from the verification nodes,
which verify and independently vote for them depending on
their highest priority. Then, the confirmation nodes confirm
the results that were provided by the verification nodes and
finally establish a consensus result. Upon the reception of
an established result, a new round begins. The protocol is
only implemented in the Ontology [35] platform – a public,
high performance and scalable permissioned blockchain - that
enables smart contracts for different business requirements.
F. Tendermint: Hyperledger Burrow, Autonity, Ethermint
Tendermint [39], which is majorly adopted in Burrow
[40], Autonity [41] and Ethermint [42], is designed
as a deterministic protocol under a partially synchronous
communication. Although the Tendermint consensus has
similarities to other BFT protocols, the voting power in this
protocol differs and is defined based on each node’s stake.
Particularly in the propose phase, a VR is deterministically
selected, according to the rate of its stake, to propose a block
for a specific height. Then, for a block to be committed, the
pre-vote, pre-commit and the commit phases have to follow
in a way similar to most BFT protocols.
Furthermore, a concept called locks or polka is included
in Tendermint’s terminology. More precisely, in the pre-
commit phase, if a proposed block gathers more than the 2/3
of the VRs’ pre-votes for a block, then a lock on the proposed
VR occurs. For various reasons, a new block may fail to be
committed in a specific height. In this case, the protocol moves
on to a new round with a new VR to propose a new block for
that height. In such a round, the new proposer may be locked
in a block from a preceding round. Then the proposed-locked
block is the same as before and in its proposal a proof-of-lock
(PoL) is added. The PoL [39] is a collection of pre-votes
from the VRs, concerning the situation of a proposed block,
whether that is locked or unlocked.
In the pre-vote phase, each locked VR signs and dissemi-
nates a pre-vote concerning its locked block. Frequently, due
to network asynchrony, the VRs may not obtain any proposal
or even worse, obtain an invalid block. In such a case, they
sign and then disseminate a nil pre-vote. Generally, a nil
vote, depending on the phase that is taking place, is a vote
to either move to the next round or to unlock a block and
a situation in a later round, when another block is locked
for the same height. In the pre-commit phase, if more than
2/3 from the pre-votes are nil votes, then the VR and the
block are considered unlocked and a propose phase of a new
round is initiated. Otherwise, the VRs enter the commit phase.
Although Tendermint is a secure BFT consensus protocol,
its implementation in Ethermint and Burrow provides low
and medium transaction throughput (respectivelly) making the
protocol not the best option for IoT environments.
G. Exonum consensus: Exonum
The Exonum consensus [43], a customized BFT algorithm,
is built by Bitfury and implemented only to the Exonum
platform. The network comprises two different kinds of nodes,
with each kind to have been assigned a different work to
perform; on the one hand the Auditors, which do not assist in
reaching consensus but can read the blocks’ transactions and
on the other hand the validators, herein called VRs, which
participate in the consensus process. As it commonly happens
in a BFT protocol, each round is initiated with an elected LVR
who sends a proposal to be embodied in the blockchain. The
three-phase consensus (pre-vote, pre-commit and commit)
is almost the same for the Exonum consensus. Similarly to
Tendermint, a special concept called “lock” is added to the
protocol. The lock defines that the VR, whose pre-vote block
has gather more than 2/3 of the approvals from the network,
gives up voting for other VRs’ proposals and locks on its
own, without giving any permission to change it. Then, the VR
broadcasts a pre-vote message expressing its locked condition
on the specific proposal. With high throughput, low latency
and the support of smart contracts, Exonum makes a good
candidate to be implemented in IoT networks if the concept
of “locks” is connected with IoT-based criteria.
H. DPoS: EOSIO, Bitshares, Tron , Tezos, Lisk
Delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS), a reputation-based con-
sensus protocol, is implemented in Bitshares [44], EOSIO
[45], Tron [46], Tezos [47], and Lisk [48]. In DPoS,
the nodes vote with reputation scores to choose a class of
delegates that will be assigned to create blocks. In each round,
among the set of delegates, a leader is selected in a way
defined by the respective distributed ledger. The leader is
incentivized to follow the protocol and get rewarded upon
the creation of an honest block and penalized or blacklisted
in any other case. Among the delegates, a contest on which
one of them is going to be included in the validation set
takes place, with each delegate promising various levels of
rewards to its voters if it is elected as a leader. Each ledger
follows its owns parameters and by using a small number of
validators, finality can be achieved promptly. The performance
evaluation of DPoS varies across different platforms, with
EOSIO and Bitshares to provide a desirable, suitable and
high performance network for IoT environments if the stake
is replaced with IoT-based criteria.
I. Clique / Aura: Quorum, Parity, Autonity
Clique and Aura are POA protocols [29] developed to
supposedly displace the computational consumption in permis-
sioned blockchains and to increase the transaction throughput.
Clique is implemented in Quorum [23] and Autonity
[41]. The time in Clique proceeds in epochs, where during
each epoch the current mining leader and multiple other
authorities are allowed to propose a block after a determined
number of epochs. Aura, on the other hand, is implemented in
Parity [49] and does not commit the proposed block at once,
but rather adds an extra round, called “block acceptance”,
to examine if the received block is the same to all the
authorities. In cases where the leader has not proposed any
block (even empty) or has proposed multiple and contrasting
blocks to various authorities, then the leader’s position is
under vote. If the leader is emerged as malicious then it is
removed. An academic research [29] showed that under the
presence of byzantine authorities Clique and Aura may fork
and thus result in the violation of the protocol’s safety and
reduction of the network’s throughput. Clique and Aura
provide high Byzantine fault tolerance of 2f +1 nodes, but as
consensus protocols might encounter network delays and block
confirmation time over 5sec, which may not be admissible in
delay-delicate IoT environments.
J. DBFT: NEO, Ontology
Developed from the NEO team [50] and later adjusted to
the Ontology platform [35], the delegated Byzantine fault
tolerance (DBFT) protocol follows the structure of PBFT and
DPoS, providing thus the best of both worlds. From PBFT,
the protocol inherits the three-phase consensus without the
need for all the nodes to participate in it. With this adjustment
the protocol becomes stable and averts malicious forks. On
the other hand, the voting system, in which only the delegates
can execute the consensus process, is inherited from the DPoS
protocol, providing thus a sampling of the most trusted entities
in the network. The derived advantages of the combination
of the two are: the instant transaction finality without forks
and a fast voting-based method to elect the delegates. The
high transaction throughput and the security that the protocol
provides are enticing features for IoT applications. However,
in Ontology and in NEO platform, the block confirmation
time is 5 20sec, which is beyond the appropriate restraints
and makes the protocol not so applicable for IoT devices.
K. YAC: Hyperledger Iroha
Yet another consensus (YAC) [51] is a novel protocol
implemented in Hyperledger Iroha [52] with its priority
the mobile app development using the simplest possible con-
struction. In the YAC protocol, the validation process is not part
of the consensus, but it is rather based on the transaction flow
of Iroha. In order to be considered valid, each transaction has
to pass at first the stateless validation — in which the transac-
tion’s signature and format are checked — and afterwards the
stateful validation that takes place in a slower form, after the
ordering process. The procedures performed by the protocol
are limited in ordering and consensus; The first is executed
by the ordering service and the later by an ordered list of
peers, in which the first peer is considered to be the leader.
Although, the Iroha’s transaction flow to an extent reminds
us of Fabic’s, here only the verified transactions are included
in a block. Upon the reception of the ordered sequence of
transactions in a pattern of proposals, the peers perform the
stateful validation check, remove invalid transactions from
the sequence of transaction, create a proposed block, vote
the proposed block through signing and then disseminate
it to the leader. After receiving 2/3 of the proposed-voted
blocks, the leader sends to all the consensus peers a commit
message manifesting which block should be accepted to their
chains. Although Iroha’s throughput is satisfiable for IoT
environments, the block confirmation time is slightly over from
other favorable permissioned blockchains due to the restraints
that small vote delays enforce on the peers in order to come
to an agreement on a specific proposal.
L. PoET: Sawtooth
To solve the problem of Byzantine agreement and to avoid
the wasteful computational power that Nakamoto’s consen-
sus utilizes [53], proof-of-elapsed time (PoET) implements
a lottery-based algorithm to achieve fairness, investment and
verification in the leader election process. The peers in
Sawtooth [22] are thoughtfully elected to execute requests
after waiting an indefinite period of time [54]. The peer with
the lowest waiting time creates the new block. To certify that
each peer’s time has actually elapsed, the protocol demands
the whole critical process to be performed in a private memory
area called trusted executed environment (TEE), i.e. Intel SGX
[55]. Specifically, the TEE’s utility, among others, is to provide
a cohesion proof that results from a trusted function, often
called “enclave”, by means of remote attestation in order
to establish trust on the consensus network. The protocol is
BFT but malicious adversaries can manipulate the network if
they compromise participating nodes beyond the threshold of
Θ( log lognlogn ) [56]. The protocol possesses the required security
and performance criteria to be deployed in IoT environments,
but without integration of the SGX hardware, PoET’s security
degrades into the family of CFT protocols.
M. RPCA: Ripple
The Ripple consensus algorithm (RPCA), was introduced
in 2014 by Schwartz et al. [57], as the fundamental protocol
for a secure and fast real-time cryptocurrency-based system to
transfer remittances without the support of smart contracts. In
the RPCA, the nodes propose the assembled transactions from
their clients to the validators to reach consensus. The time in
Ripple is measured in epochs, with each epoch involving
several rounds of transactions’ refinement. Initially, with the
use of a unique node list (UNL), each node identifies all the
nodes with which it can instantaneously interact, exchange
messages and trust. In a vast network, such as Ripple, trust
does not actually mean that each node in a UNL is trusted,
but rather that this node will not attempt to circumvent the
network with votes on inaccurate transactions. A transaction
with a minimum threshold of yes-votes is forwarded to the
next round, while others, that do not exceed the threshold, are
either deserted; if malicious, or embodied in a candidate set
of new and not yet applied transactions on the ledger. The
transactions that in the final round exceed with positive votes
with a percentage of 80% of the node’s UNL, are included to
the ledger, while the candidate set is forwarded for consensus
on the next ledger. Taking into account that Ripple is a
semi-permissioned system, its cryptocurrency-based nature, its
overall performance and the fact that the percentage of the
TABLE I
CRITERIA FOR THE SUITABILITY OF CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS IN IOT
Criteria Suitability Symbol
FT and LP 0 %
CFT and MP 25 %
BFT and MP 50 %
CFT and HP 75 %
BFT and HP 100 %
tolerated malicious validators in each node’s UNL is 20%; the
protocol is not a good option for IoT deployment.
V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
The consensus protocols presented in the previous sections
have been incorporated into various permissioned blockchain
platforms. The transaction throughput and latency are the
most critical factors to consider in IoT deployments, as it is
required a transaction to be broadcast and appended into a
block in a matter of seconds or even less. According to [7],
throughput and latency are mapped to a three-valued scale,
namely low, medium, and high, where the thresholds that
define throughput are 100 and 1000 transactions per second
(TPS) respectively; in addition, latency characterization relies
on the time units (milliseconds, seconds, or minutes). In
this paper, we follow the same three-valued scale but the
throughput (resp. latency) thresholds have been adjusted to
500 and 1500 TPS (resp. 1sec and 10sec) respectively to meet
IoT applications’ requirements.
Table I, explains the symbols used below for characterizing
the consensus’ suitability in IoT networks. With the most
prominent BFT protocols having high performance (HP) are
denoted, whereas is used for BFT protocols with medium
performance (MP). On the contrary, high performance CFT
protocols are appropriate for IoT applications only under the
assumption of non-adversarial and honest environment. These
assumptions are quite restrictive, focusing on resiliency only,
and hence these protocols’ suitability is not the maximum
possible; for the same reasons, the suitability of CFT protocols
with a medium performance is . Finally, fault tolerant and
low performance (LP) protocols are denoted with , implying
that they are not suitable to IoT environments.
Next, a comparative evaluation of 13 consensus protocols
and their implementation into blockchain platforms is shown
in Table II; the performance metrics used to determine IoT
suitability are fault tolerance, the adoption under permis-
sioned blockchain platforms, transactions’ performance, and
latency. The transaction’s performance is measured in TPS,
while the values reported for latency concern either the block
confirmation time or the time needed for a transaction to
be ordered or notarized, e.g. in Fabric, Corda, etc. The
analysis of centralized and PoW based consensus protocols
are not included in our survey and in Table II, as they are
either designed for just facilitating development or they are
computationally expensive. The approach used to compute the
TABLE II

















Aura BFT: 2f + 1 Parity 35 45 3 7sec [58] Low
BFT-SMaRt BFT: 3f + 1
Fabric > 10K 0.5sec [33] High
Symbiont 80K < 1sec [3] High
DBFT BFT: 3f + 1 NEO < 1K 15 20sec [50] Low
DPoS BFT: 3f + 1
EOSIO 1K 6K < 1sec [45] High
Bitshares 100K 1sec [44] High
Tron > 2K 3sec [46] Med
Lisk 2.5 6min [59] Low
Tezos ≈ 40 ≈ 30min [47] Low
Exonum BFT: 3f + 1 Exonum ≈ 5K 0.5sec [60] High
IBFT BFT: 3f + 1 Quorum ≈ 600 4.5sec [26] Med
Kafka CFT: 2t + 1
Fabric 3.5K < 1sec [2] High
Corda 3K 15K 1sec [19], [61] High
PoET-SGX BFT: Θ( log logn
logn
) Sawtooth 1K 2.3K < 1sec [25] High
Raft CFT: 2t + 1
Corda 100 200 1sec [25] Low
Quorum ≈ 650 4.5sec [26] Med
Fabric ≈ 7K < 1sec [28] High
Ripple BFT: 4f + 1 Ripple 1.5K 4sec [62] Med
Tendermint BFT: 3f + 1
Ethermint 200 800 < 1sec [42] Med
Burrow > 400 n/a [63] Low
VBFT BFT: 3f + 1 Ontology > 3K 5 10sec [35] Med
YAC BFT: 3f + 1 Iroha several 1K < 3sec [51], [64] Med
overall performance in Table II is that it equals the minimum
of the scores achieved by a protocol’s throughput and latency.
Although, the above features are evaluated under different
setups for different blockchain platforms, the performance of
several consensus protocols is not mentioned in their white
papers. It is expected that, if implemented in a secure, fast,
and scalable permissioned blockchain, a high performance
consensus protocol should have a promising throughput and
low latency. For example, Sawtooth is considered to be
a high performance blockchain platform. However, it is not
thoroughly tested under different setups in a large scale envi-
ronment yet. For this reason, such protocols are not currently
included in Table II. The main outcome of the analysis is
that even by replacing the monetary concepts with IoT-based
criteria, a small number of the proposed consensus protocols
meet all the performance and security requirements. With the
exception of Sawtooth that is hardware supported by a TEE
in its PoET-SGX consensus, the rest of the BFT protocols
(BFT-SMaRt, DPoS, and Exonum) achieve quite a high
throughput that can reach 100K TPS and latency as low as
0.5sec.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the potential of using fault-tolerant consensus
protocols in IoT networks is investigated. The protocols are
analyzed in terms of their performance under different permis-
sioned blockchain platforms and their tolerance against faults,
including adversarial ones — a property that is highly desirable
in the generally vulnerable IoT ecosystem. The integrated
BFT protocols in Hyperledger Fabric, seem to offer a
good option for IoT networks when it comes to permissioned
blockchains.
Remarkably, several of the surveyed consensus protocols
are under development and not thoroughly tested at the time
of writing; for this reason, they have not been included in the
comparison. Apart from the performance and fault tolerance
that are explored in this paper, several other limitations are
faced when blockchain technology is applied in IoT networks.
Limitations such as scalability, data privacy, and several other
aspects that are part of our going research and will be included
in a forthcoming work.
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